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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the influence of 
supervisor's support and protection against whistleblowing decision in the 
organizations of local government in Indonesia. Also, under a condition of superior 
support and protection, this study examines the effects of auditors' and non-
auditor/employees' types of work in the organization of local governments towards the 
decision on whistleblowing the fraud. This research uses the experimental method to 
48 students of Master of Accounting in a large state-owned university. By using four-
case scenarios, participants were asked to answer the possibility to whistleblow the 
fraud that occurred in a local government organization. The results of this research 
indicate that the employee would be courageous to whistleblow the fraud when they 
feel supported by their employers. The results also explain the importance of 
protection for whistleblowers. The results indicate that high protection is still required 
by the whistleblower to avoid the threat of any retaliation when the supervisor's 
support is low. Besides, the results reveal that, under the condition of high 
supervisor's support and protection, auditors would take a higher whistleblowing 
decision than non-auditors.. 
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Intisari: Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji secara empiris pengaruh 
dukungan atasan dan perlindungan terhadap keputusan whistleblowing di organisasi 
pemerintah daerah di Indonesia. Selain itu, di bawah kondisi dukungan dan 
perlindungan yang kuat, penelitian ini juga menguji pengaruh jenis pekerjaan auditor 
dan non-auditor/karyawan dalam organisasi pemerintah daerah terhadap keputusan 
tentang pengungkap fakta penipuan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode eksperimen 
untuk 48 mahasiswa Magister Akuntansi di sebuah perguruan tinggi negeri besar. 
Dengan menggunakan empat kasus skenario, peserta diminta untuk menjawab 
kemungkinan untuk mengungkap penipuan yang terjadi di organisasi pemerintah 
lokal. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa karyawan akan berani untuk 
mengungkap penipuan ketika mereka merasa didukung oleh majikan mereka. 
Hasilnya juga menjelaskan pentingnya perlindungan bagi pelapor. Hal ini 
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menunjukkan bahwa perlindungan yang kuat masih diperlukan oleh whistleblower 
untuk menghindari ancaman pembalasan ketika dukungan supervisor rendah. Selain 
itu, hasil menunjukkan bahwa, di bawah kondisi dukungan dan perlindungan 
supervisor yang kuat, auditor akan mengambil keputusan whistleblowing lebih tinggi 
daripada non-auditor. 
 
Kata Kunci:  dukungan supervisor, perlindungan, whistleblowing, pemerintah daerah 
 
1. Introduction 
Disclosures by the members of the organization about immoral and unlawful 
practices to persons or institutions that may influence the action are called a 
whistleblowing (Miceli, 2004). By these disclosures, errors can be immediately 
identified and corrected, thereby increasing efficiency, increasing employee morale, 
and potentially avoiding the negative reputation and financial consequences of 
lawsuits. Thus, there is considerable social value in understanding the whistleblowing 
process (Near & Miceli, 2008).  
One form of fraud is a fraudulent financial statement that can be reported through 
a whistleblower hotline. Vadera et al. (2009) find that the type of fraud and 
seriousness level of fraud affect a person to report it. Robinson et al. (2012) also 
examine that the type of fraud committed affects employee decisions to report. 
Providing the information by people within the organization plays an essential role in 
solving the problem of fraud because whistleblowers can easily access information 
about errors without any great effort (Burke & Cooper, 2013). 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2012) defines fraud as 
intentional misuse of personal enrichment. ACFE (2012) categorizes the cheating in 
three groups as follows: 1) Financial statement fraud, defined as fraud committed by 
management in the form of financial statements material misstatement. 2) Asset 
misappropriation and fraudulent disbursement. 3) Corruption, divided into a conflict 
of interests, bribery, illegal gratuity, and economic extortion. Lee & Fargher (2013) 
argues that some of these frauds can sometimes be found by whistleblowing process. 
Whistleblowing research is more prevalent in the private sector than in 
governmental organizations (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). This issue is 
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becoming the concern in research because corporate frauds lead for 5% losses more 
than worldwide organizational income (Dworkin, 2007). Whistleblowing can also be 
seen in government organizations (Cho & Song, 2015). Rothschild (2013) asserts that 
whistleblowing can lead to substantial change and reformation in government 
organizations. While from a quantitative perspective, governmental organizations have 
a higher percentage of reporting errors than the private sector. Vadera et al. (2009) 
suggest that whistleblowing is a complex process. Therefore, the organizational 
characteristics can help to understand the reported unethical practices. Similarly, 
Valentine et al. (2006) suggest that to achieve the objectives of an ethics program, it 
depends on the organizational context. It is possible that there is a fraud that needs to 
be revealed in the governmental organizations. 
Fraud in government organizations is different from private organizations. The 
type of fraud that occurs in the governmental organizations is in the form of 
corruption. Corruption in Indonesian governmental organizations refers to the UU 
TPK No. 31 of 1999. In Article 2 paragraph (1), it is stated that corruption is any 
person who unlawfully commits enrichment of himself or others or a corporation that 
may harm the financial or the state economy, paragraph (2) made in certain 
circumstances. The concept of fraud used in this research is a corruption according to 
UU TPK No. 31 in 1999 because corruption in governmental organizations could 
harm the state's finances and the state's economy. 
In governmental organizations, corruption proportionally occurs in many local 
governments. This is evident from the KPK data from 2004 to May 2016 which 
indicate that regents or mayors who have been entangled in KPK cases are accounted 
as many as 56 people. Based on KPK data above, the handling of corruption that 
occurred in local government institutions was ranked as the 2nd largest case 
(acch.kpk.go.id). Nevertheless, fraud disclosure research in governmental 
organizations is still rare. The results also show a complex antecedent affecting the 
disclosure of the fraud. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) also releases the findings 
that the most corruptive person during the year 2015 is a civil servant in the local 
government (Pemda) (Beritasatu.com, Sunday, February 7, 2016). 
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Whistleblowing research is primarily focused on three factors that influence 
reporting: (a) individual factors, such as demographics, personality, age, gender, moral 
development (Vadera et al., 2009; Chiu, 2003); (b) situational factors, such as the 
moral intensity, the seriousness of the error, the degree of ambiguity of the error, the 
relative low whistleblower position of the offender (c) such as organizational size and 
structure, internal disclosure policies, codes of ethics, compensation systems, and 
organizational culture and climate (Chen & Lai, 2014; Dasgupta & Kesharwani, 2010; 
Katz et al., 2012). The understanding of the process is complicated by the complexity 
of the variables and the interactions between them (Sims & Keenan, 1998). Therefore, 
further research requires the identification of the interactions of the factors affecting 
whistleblowing so that whistleblowing is effective. 
There are gaps in the literature and the results of whistleblowing studies that are 
still unclear. Current research emphasizes more on individual factors that influence 
whistleblowing decisions (Vandekerkhove, 2010). However, the influence of 
organizational factors on the whistleblowing process is more important. This is 
because the organization has control over the working environment rather than 
individual values or moral development. Vandekerkhove (2010) states that current 
research overlooks an essential aspect of whistleblowing management. Research is 
trapped in the focus of the whistleblower and not on the process of handling the 
problem. This has led to the need for research that concentrates on an effective 
whistleblowing process rather than examining the individual factors who conduct 
whistleblowing. 
One crucial factor which affects the disclosure of fraud is the organizational 
factor. Taylor and Curtis (2013) argue that the impact of organizational variables such 
as the interaction between organizational response and power distance affects the 
likelihood of auditors to report (via hotline) about the deviant behavior. Also, Valentin 
et al. (2006) also state that organizational support is related to ethical decisions within 
the organization. Previous research suggests that support from top management and 
superiors can predict whistleblowing (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Keenan, 2000; Sims 
& Keenan, 1998). A high level of organizational support will encourage employees to 
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act on behalf of the organization by reporting errors that occur through internal 
channels. 
Seifert et al. (2010) apply organizational justice theory to design whistleblowing 
policies and procedures. As a prosocial behavior, whistleblowing tends to increase 
when organizational procedures are the result of an exchange with superiors who are 
considered fair. The results show that policies and mechanisms incorporate the levels 
of procedural justice, distributive justice, and higher interactional justice will increase 
the likelihood that internal accountants will report fraudulent financial statements. In 
interactional justice, it focuses on the quality of interpersonal treatment that is received 
by the employees from superiors when organizational procedures are implemented 
(Bies & Moag, 1986). Interactional justice has an interpersonal component that 
reflects the extent to which individuals are treated with dignity and respect by 
superiors who can determine outcomes, obtain information, and make decisions 
(Greenberg, 1990; Scott et al., 2007). Perception of interactional justice is made up of 
interpersonal exchanges between managers and subordinates. Informal interaction 
between whistleblowers and management can sometimes damage formal processes 
(Miceli & Near, 1992; Near et al., 1993). For example, the threat of retaliation from 
superiors may be considered by the employees who will conduct whistleblowing 
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswevaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et al., 2008). 
Fair interaction is resulted from the treatment of the supervisor to the whistleblower 
by not making threats of retaliation (Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et al., 2008). 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswevaran (2005) also argue that perceived support from 
supervisors plays a role in whistleblowing decisions. 
Also, error observers who doubt the integrity and management ability to prevent 
errors can result in a very high personal risk, thus, they decide to remain silent 
(Gundlach et al., 2003; Henik 2008, Near et al., 2004). Keil et al. (2010) report that the 
perceived benefits of whistleblowing increase when trust in supervisors increased, 
which in turn was associated with higher levels of whistleblowing. 
This research is based on the theory of social exchange between employees and 
superiors as a complement to the theory of justice. Employees will disclose if there is 
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supervisor support. Employees form a perception of the extent to which the supervisor 
appreciate their contributions and care about their well-being or called as perceived 
supervisor support (PSS) support (Kottke & Sharafinski, 1988). The supervisor acts as 
an organizational agent in managing subordinates. The supervisor is very appreciated 
by the organization and playing a role in realizing the character of the organization 
(Roadhes & Eisenberger, 2002). Employee perceptions of the status given to the 
superiors by the organization provide confidence that the support of superiors is also 
the support of the organization. 
The organization has provided support by establishing and promoting the use of 
anonymous whistleblower hotline (Bedard et al., 2008; Curtis and Taylor, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the survey consistently showed that a large number of employees who 
realized the error chose not to report (Miceli et al., 2008). The main reason is the fact 
that the individual is afraid of receiving retaliation as a consequence of reporting the 
observed error. One example is life and career will be damaged as a result of reprisals 
(Brickey 2003; Ramirez 2007; Bowen et al., 2010). Specifically, Miceli and Near 
(2002) report that whistleblowers tend to receive any retaliation if the top management 
or supervisors maintain the errors and retaliate to whistleblowers. It is evident that the 
contextual variables are associated with reprisals including from senior management, 
direct supervisors, and co-workers, as well as an organizational climate for 
whistleblowing. Lack of support from supervisors and senior management leads to 
retaliation of whistleblowers (Near and Miceli, 1986). 
In order to help ease the fear of retaliation and encourage reporting, ACFE (2012) 
recommends that organizations should emphasize anti-retaliation protection to the 
employees (e.g., protection from harassment, loosing of employment or promotion, 
and/or retaliation forms), other than confidentiality and anonymity in the 
whistleblower hotline policy (Mesmer-Magmus & Vismesvaran, 2005). Protection 
from retaliation is essential because of the risks faced by whistleblowers, even when 
there is anonymity provision. Anonymity often does not guarantee the confidentiality 
of the whistleblower because during the investigation evidence is needed that may 
identify the whistleblowers and lead them to be exposed to the risk of retaliation 
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(Fasterling & Lewis 2014). Protection from any forms of retaliation received by the 
whistleblowers in hotline policies will reduce employee fears, which will motivate 
employees to report via hotline compared to the absence of protection. 
Several studies have shown that anti-retaliation laws are largely ineffective in 
motivating whistleblowing (Dworkin, 2007; Dworkin & Near, 1997; Miceli et al., 
2008). The legal experts argue that the specific protection is afforded by the Act for 
whistleblowers, has a relatively narrow range and is far from reality (Dworkin, 2007; 
Miceli et al., 2008). Also, the focus of this research is on organizational policies and 
management behaviors that can influence employee decisions to disclose fraud. The 
study based on the assumption that when an organization establishes a formal internal 
channel and provides protection, employees will be more daring to report mistakes 
(Moberly, 2006). 
This study aims to test empirically the influence of superior support and 
protection toward whistleblowing decisions on local governmental organizations using 
experimental methods based on the theory of social exchange. Based on the theory of 
social reactance, this study also examines the effect of auditor and non-auditor types 
of work in local government organizations on whistleblowing decisions. 
This research is expected to contribute to the development of the theory of 
whistleblowing by explaining the support of superiors and protections which affect the 
whistleblowing decisions namely the implementation of social exchange theory and 
social reactance theory. This research is expected to also contribute to the design of 
whistleblowing procedures that are effective in disclosing the financial fraud to 
government organizations in Indonesia. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: we provide a theoretical framework and 
development of hypotheses, followed by the method, and the analysis and results. We 
conclude with a discussion of our findings, recommendations, study limitations, and 
suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Development of Hypotheses 
2.1 Theory of Social Exchange 
The theory of social exchange or social exchange theory explains the relationship 
between employees, and their organizations are an exchange of relations (Eisenberger 
et al., 1986). The employee is willing to work in an organization because the employee 
will redeem his business and loyalty with certain benefits. Eisenberger et al. (1986) 
state that employees perceive work as a form of exchange with their needs, so they 
always assess the organization which has concerned with the business that has been 
donated in return. In other words, employees who have extra work, expect 
organizations to provide a balanced reward. Employees also assess whether their 
socio-emotional needs, such as the need for recognition and respect are also met 
(Aselage and Eisenberger, 2003). Eisenberger et al. (1986) explain that organizational 
support is built by organizational treatments received by employees, such as in 
honorarium payments, promotion, trust, and participation in organizational 
policymaking. Employee assessment of the organization is also done by considering 
the frequency, seriousness, and sincerity of the organization in providing awards and 
recognition of the results of their operations (Eisenberger et al., 1990; Eisenberger et 
al., 1997). The awards which are given to organizational awareness will have a more 
significant impact on organizational support than the external pressure, such as union 
pressure or regulation (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002).  
In the theory of social exchange, a person who has received a specific advantage 
will have a sense of obligation to repay what he has received (Eisenberger et al., 
1986). The actions taken by the employee are viewed as the feedback for the actions 
of the organization. Management behaviors and organizational policies are the basis 
for employees to interpret organizational support. For employees, organizational 
support reflects how far which the leaders are committed to their interests. Bell and 
Menguc (2002) argue that there is an influence of the organizational support for 
contextual performance that includes various OCB (Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior) behaviors, such as helping others or defending the organization toward its 
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goals. Other studies have also reported a direct positive effect between POS (Perceive 
Organizational Support) and OCB (Masterson et al., 2000). 
 
2.2. Psychological Reactance Theory 
The literature on social psychology shows the opposite effect of social pressures. 
The theory of psychological reactance (Brehm 1966, Brehm & Brehm 1981) suggests 
that the attempts to persuade individuals to act in some way are often 
counterproductive, as this threatens the individual freedom. According to this 
perspective, individuals who are pressed to act in a certain way, perceive their freedom 
behavior to be reduced. 
A whistleblower can also be a fraudster in the organization. Following the social 
pressure theory, someone does something which is not by a personal desire, but 
because there is social pressure (Dezoort & Lord, 1997). In the theory of social 
pressure in accounting, DeZoort and Lord (1997) distinguish three forms of social 
pressure, namely 1) Compliance pressure on the explicit demand of individuals at any 
level. 2) Obedience pressure which refers to the pressure to obey the authorities. 3) 
Conformity pressure which refers to the pressure of group members. Acts that deviate 
from members of the organization, often occur because of the social pressure. 
Hartman and Maas (2010) research show that Business Unit controllers are faced with 
a dilemma about the interests of their units by deliberately creating budget slack. The 
creation of this slack, one of which is influenced by pressure from Business Unit 
managers. However, Davis et al. (2006) suggest that management accountants are 
more likely to make budget slack when they face the pressure of obedience directly 
from the supervisor. This result confirms earlier findings in psychological and auditing 
literature that social pressures induce individual conformity to avoid the negative 
consequences arising from a deviation from the group or being unfaithful to a higher 
authority (Lord & DeZoort, 1997).  
In a governmental organization, a person commits an illegal and immoral act, 
perhaps not because of personal motivation, but possibly because of the social 
pressure of the group or the head of the organization. According to the theory of 
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psychological reactance, pressure can lead to psychological reactance occurring when 
freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
Reactance considers unpleasant circumstances, which is composed of emotional 
components (e.g., feelings of anger) and cognitive components (e.g., resistance to 
authority, Rains, 2013). Reactance also requires behavior which tends to reject 
unlawful behavior (Brehm, 1966). 
 
2.3 Supervisor Support 
Employees develop a common view that supervisors contribute to their well-
being (Kottke & Sharafinski, 1988). Because supervisors act as organizational agents, 
they have a responsibility to lead and evaluate subordinate performance. Employees 
see superiors act in their favor as an indication of organizational support (Eisenberger 
et al., 2002). Also, employees understand that the superior's evaluation of the 
subordinates is often informed to the top management, which ultimately contributes to 
the superior support relationship with employee performance. Support from superiors 
has also been assessed regarding performance measurements involving a leader-
member exchanges and supervisor’s considerations. 
Most of the theories explain organizational relationships with the belief of the 
employees that employees see their supervisor as an organizational agent. For 
example, the psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1989, 1998) which assumes 
that employees assume the promises of superiors as the promise from the organization 
(Eisenberger et al., 2002; Eisenberger et al., 1986). Therefore, employees generalize 
their exchange relationships with superiors as an exchange for the organization 
because they see the supervisor as an organizational representative. Eisenberger et al. 
(2010) state that employees form a perception of the similarity between the supervisor 
and the organization as the embodiment of the supervisory organization (SOE / 
Supervisor Organizational Embodiment) (Eisenberger et al., 2010). The bigger the 
SOE, the higher the employees may feel that the superior's treatment is the treatment 
by the organization. Similarly, Near and Miceli (1996) found that lack of support from 
supervisors and top management will decrease the whistleblowing. An ethical leader 
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will support and encourage ethical behavior, so it can motivate employees to uncover 
mistakes (Bhal & Dadhich, 2011). 
H1: Supervisor support positively affects fraudulent disclosure decisions. 
 
2.4. Protection 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2012) finds that 
whistleblowing is the most common method of detecting fraud. The whistleblower has 
managed to uncover 43 percent of all reported fraud (Cho & Song, 2015). The auditor 
has a vital role in detecting fraudulent financial reporting through an adequate 
whistleblower hotline. Sometimes, however, the auditor accepts the damaging 
consequences of the client's company reputation which is being audited. Chaney and 
Philipich (2002) find that Andersen's clients experienced significant negative 
cumulative abnormal returns, after the announcement that the company had been 
involved in Enron's shredding documents inspection. Subsequently, clients of public 
accounting firms experienced abnormal negative returns about the disclosure of 
activities associated with failed audits (Ramirez 2007). Individuals may fear that they 
will suffer from job retaliation as a consequence of reporting. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that previous studies identified a strong negative relationship between the 
fear of retaliation and the intention to report the error (Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran 2005). 
Some previous studies have examined the use of whistleblower hotline in the 
context of public accountants (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran 2005, Curtis & 
Taylor, 2009). Most studies have examined the impact of the whistleblower 
anonymity provision and the choice of external reporting outlets on the decision to 
reveal the error. For example, Curtis and Taylor (2009) survey auditors and find that 
participants have a less willingness to report unethical behavior when their identities 
might be disclosed. Meanwhile, Robertson at al. (2011) finds that auditors prefer to 
report anonymously when the fraudster has a bad reputation, but prefer to report using 
a non-anonymous outlet when the fraudster has a good reputation. 
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Kaplan et al. (2009) specifically examined the effect of hotline security power on 
whistleblower reporting. The previous researchers found that participants are 
significantly less likely to report errors when the anonymous whistleblower protection 
policies are strong (e.g., the hotline was managed by a third or external party, as well 
as that the information is maintained in a tightly controlled secret environment). This 
research predicts that the higher the security level of the whistleblower hotline, the 
higher the probability of a whistleblower to report an error. The results suggest that 
whistleblowers are more likely to report through internal hotlines and without any 
information control. The results of Kaplan et al. (2009) state that whistleblowers are 
unwilling to report to the third parties. The whistleblowing hotline policy description 
may have been enough to create confidence in the anonymous reporting channel. 
Therefore, low protection in a whistleblower hotline policy can harm people who 
commit fraud disclosure. 
One way to reduce the fear of retaliation and to increase employees' willingness 
to report, the organization has included the types of protection in the whistleblower 
hotline policy (Wainberg & Perreault, 2016). That is, in spite of providing reporting 
channels, confidentiality and anonymity, an organization also includes special forms 
of protection from retaliation (such as harassment, loss of job, loss of promotion, 
decline in professionalism, and punishment, and financial consequences). ACFE 
(2012) recommends protection towards the retaliation to be offered to employees. A 
recent survey by Hassink et al. (2007) and Lee and Fargher (2013) suggest that many 
organizations now choose to include protection in the organization's whistleblowing 
policy manual. 
H2: Protection has a positive effect on fraud disclosure decisions. 
 
In the theory of organizational support, there is the possibility that employees 
may have a different view that employers as representatives of the organization. 
Employees see the supervisor not only as an organizational agent but also as a stand-
alone individual, with different characteristics from the organization. Therefore, an 
employee will see the supervisor that is aligned with the organization or less in line 
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with the organization. The variation in alignment of the supervisor with the 
organization can help to explain how far the variations affect the organizational 
commitment (Eisenberger et al., 2010). If the supervisor acts in a way that is different 
from the organization's strategic goals, then the employee also has a lower perceive 
about the characteristics of the supervisor with the organization. Therefore, employees 
will feel that the support of superiors is not the same as the support of the 
organization, because superiors have personality characteristics that show independent 
behavior which is independent of the organization. For example, new technologies 
adopted by the organizations often fail to be promoted by the management because 
supervisors consider the technology to have a little benefit (Davis, 1989). Also, 
supervisors believe that the implementation of technology will involve in a steep 
learning curve and not worth with the effort spent (Magni & Pennarola, 2008). These 
conditions cause employees to have a low commitment to the organization because 
they feel that they are not supported by superiors. 
When a whistleblower feels unsupported by an internal party, they will use an 
external channel to report a violation (Dasgupta & Kesharwani, 2010). Whistleblowers 
who report errors through external channels, they are more likely to receive retaliation 
which may be worse rather than when the internal channels are used (Near & Miceli, 
1986). The use of external channels is more likely to acquire retaliatory behavior, as it 
violates the strength and structure of authority within the organization. Similarly, 
whistleblowers who fail to use anonymous channels during the whistleblowing 
process are more likely to receive retaliation (Miceli & Near, 1994). 
Specifically, Miceli et al. (2008) report that the effectiveness of whistleblowers 
tends to get any retaliation unless the supervisor or top management could retain 
retaliation to the reporter. The internal whistleblower becomes effective 
(whistleblowing to the parties within the organization or through a secret hotline), by 
providing an ethical procedure to stop cheating. This action can lead a benefit and 
keep the company's reputation (Miceli et al., 2008). Internal disclosure policies 
typically identify employees' responsibility to disclose errors to the certain parties 
within the organization. Employees can make internal disclosures through appropriate 
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communication channels, formal investigation procedures, and protection guarantees 
for employees who have good intentions to disclose errors (Teo & Caspersz, 2011). 
H3: Under conditions of supervisor’s support is low, and high protection will have a 
positive effect on fraud disclosure decisions. 
 
2.5. Type of work 
A whistleblower is often used to refer someone who seeks to uncover dishonesty 
and errors that occur within the organization. A whistleblower is an employee or 
auditor who tries to stop errors that may be hidden within the organization 
(Rothschild, 2008., Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Vadera et al., 2009). The 
management accountant or the financial officer may participate in fraud because of a 
pressure placed by a superior or co-worker. This pressure generates reactance, which 
aims to re-establish a sense of freedom and personal responsibility for the chosen 
decision. Individuals experience a reactance to reject the requested behavior, and often 
decide to act the other way (Brehm & Brehm 1981). Pressure from managers to 
deviate from professional guidelines causes individuals to firmly oppose such 
behavior and put on their new role as professional and independent. In the case of 
fraudulent behavior, there is a possibility, and the fraudster turns to report because of 
their reaction to social pressure so that the management accountant will have a higher 
responsibility to report fraud than the auditor. 
H4: Under conditions of supervisor’s support is low; high protection will have a 
higher positive effect on fraudulent disclosure decisions by non-auditors than 
auditors. 
 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
Participants in this research are students of Accounting Magister Program in a 
Faculty of Economics and Business of a large state-owned university in the academic 
year of 2015. Total participants are calculated as many as 48 people. The participants 
work in governmental organizations, namely the Ministry of Finance of 20 students 
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(41.7%), BPKP 8 students (16.7%), regency/city government 16 students (33%), and 
the remaining four students (8.9%) from other departments in Indonesia. Participants 
are selected in positions because they know about the fraud that occurs in the local 
government. Participants are invited voluntarily to follow this experiment. In total 56 
students were participating in this research. The students come from 2 parallel classes 
who follow the course of Regional Finance Management. One student who did not 
complete the experimental instrument and seven students failed manipulation, so the 
total number of participants was 48 people. The demographic data of participants can 
be seen in table 1. Male participants are as much as 58.3%, and 41.7% are women. 
Participants aged 30 to 40 years were 70.8%, while those who aged above 40 years 
were only 2.1%. Participants work experience is in between 5 to 10 years of 66.7%, 
while less than five years as much as 22.9%. Participants who work as government 
auditors’ amount to 22 people (45.8%). While 54.2% work as a non-auditor who work 
in the financial department at their institution. 
 
3.2. Experimental Procedure 
The experimental process was carried out with an experimental laboratory. 
Experimenter distributes the experiment materials randomly. The randomization test 
results show that there is no difference from the demographics for each cell. The case 
material is designed based on paper and pencil and consists of instructions, case 
sketches, and demographic questionnaires. Sketches of error include manipulation in 
the procurement process of goods/ services, deviation of procurement procedures, for 
example, the provisions of goods auctioned refers to the brand, not on the quality and 
specifications, the pricing of its estimates, the determination of the winning bidder. 
This is due to this mode that often occurs in local governmental organizations. The 
participants were given by manipulation of high and low supervisor’s support, and 
high and low protection. The case sketch is illustrated with short sentences and 
drawings which make it easier for participants to remember and understand. The 
experimental instrument has been tested on the students six times until the participants 
can pass the manipulation check. At the end of the case, participants were asked to 
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answer two questions that were used to check participants' understanding of cases 
given on a scale of 1-10. The participant who answered correctly was less than the 
average of the participants' answers, so they were excluded from the analysis.  
 
Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants 
 
Demography  
N=48 
Percentage Mean 
WB 
Std Sig. 
(t-test) 
 
Gender     0,952 
Female 20 41,7 % 6,0000 2,10263  
Male 28 58,3 % 5,9286 2,52291  
      
Age     0,207 
< 30 years old 13 27,1 % 6,0000 2,04124  
30 – 40 years old 34 70,8 % 5,8235 2,39280  
>40 years old 1 2,1 % 10,0000  . 
      
Job Types     0,789 
Auditor 22 45,8 % 5,8182 2,19602  
Non-Auditor 26 54,2 % 6,0769 2,48069  
      
Experience     0,589 
<5 years 11 22,9 % 6,4545 2,11488  
5 s/d 10 years 32 66,7 % 5,9063 2,50624  
>10 years 5 10,4 % 5,2000 1,64317  
 
3.3. Measurement 
The hypotheses were tested with 2 x 2 x 2 factorial experimental between-subject 
design that consists of (1) superior support and (2) protection (3) job types: auditor 
and non-auditor. The sketches are presented in a third person focus to minimize self-
reporting bias, and the subject is measured from the likelihood that the first and third 
person focus will report a fraud. Experiments using case sketches to manipulate the 
variables superior’s support and protection consistently (Mesmer-Magnus & 
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Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008). While the measurement is done on the 
variable of types of job for auditors and non-auditors. 
 
3.4. Independent Variables 
 The independent variables consist of a supervisor’s support, protection, and job 
types: auditor and non-auditor. Supervisor’s support is when the supervisor treats 
others with respect, courtesy, and respect, and trusts the correct information and 
explanation. Therefore, superior’s support is operationalized by the supervisor’s 
behaviors to the subordinates with attention, support, trust, and respect for potential 
whistleblowers (Eisenberg et al., 2002). Interaction with management is described as 
two things: a high-level support which highlights attention, trust, support, and high 
respect, while low-level support is a threatening attitude to the whistleblowers, 
distrustful, ignoring the information provided by the whistleblowers. 
Protection is demonstrated by protecting employees from retaliation for 
disclosures that employees commit following the Witness and Victim Protection Law 
No. 13 of 2006. Under the Witness and Victim Protection Law (2006), whistleblowers 
are persons who provide information to law enforcement regarding the occurrence of a 
criminal offense. Protection includes protection from threats, self-security, family, and 
property, and there is no lawsuit against the whistleblowers. High protection is shown 
that the whistleblowers get all the security guarantees. While low protection is the 
whistleblowers does not get such protection, but only the guarantee related to the 
matter in court. 
 
3.5. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the participant's decision to conduct whistleblowing. 
To measure this variable, the average of the participants' assessment is: (1) the 
participants; and (2) others, will report cheating using a secret hotline in each scenario. 
This research asks questions in 2 forms that are for himself and others. This is because 
previous research shows a social desirability bias. Social desire bias allows 
participants to try to appear more positive than their decision. 
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3.6. Control Variables 
Employee demographic characteristics are used as the control variables to 
exclude alternatives explaining the relationship between organizational support and 
protection with whistleblowing decisions. These characteristics include age, education, 
gender, experience. Besides, there are also control variables for situational factors, 
such as cheating types. Table 1 shows that there is no significant differences in age, 
education, and experience in fraud disclosure decisions. All participants argue that 
cheating types do not differ significantly with an average score of 8.175. Meanwhile, 
to test the social desirability bias, the difference between the participants' answers in 
deciding the disclosure of fraud is compared with the response if the sketch is 
answered from a third person's perspective (Lowe et al., 2015). The result is no 
difference between the two types of questions. 
 
3.7. Check Manipulation 
The check for manipulation is conducted to test the participants in understanding 
the concepts of cheating, supervisor’s support, and protection which categorized under 
high or low conditions. The participants are asked to answer a check manipulation 
question with an answer scale from 1 to 10 (1 = very low to 10 = very high). 
Participants were given two questions for the cheating rate indicating a high fraud rate. 
The answer to the cheating sketch is considered correct if the participants answer 
above average. While check manipulation for the variables of the supervisor’s support 
and protection, each also consists of 2 questions. For high support and high protection 
sketches, answers are considered to be true if more than average of 5.39 and 5.77. 
While sketches of supervisor’s support and protection are low, then the correct answer 
is below the average of 3.98 and 3.86. The results of the analysis showed that 
participants who passed the manipulation amounted to 48 students. 
 
4. Results of Analysis and Discussion 
This research investigates the supervisor’s support, and protection can influence 
the disclosure decisions that occur in local government organizations. Hypothesis 1 
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predicts the effect of supervisor’s support on fraud disclosure decisions. In Table 2, it 
shows the results of the H1 test, which the main effect of supervisor’s support shows 
the value of F (1.429) = 10.025, p <0.003. Higher supervisor’s support results in a 
higher average of fraud reporting probability (M = 6.708) than support for low (M = 
5.208). This result supports H1. This indicates that the whistleblowing process will be 
high if there is a good interaction between the whistleblowers and the supervisors. 
Because the whistleblowing process is prosocial behavior, so if the whistleblowers are 
responded and trusted by the boss, then the whistleblowers will be more courageous to 
reveal the error. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect of protection on the decision of fraud disclosure, 
H2 test results the main effect of protection F (1,429) = 37,904, p <0,000. High 
protection results in higher average probability of fraud reporting (M = 7,417) 
compared to low protection (M = 4,500). The results support H2. Based on the theory 
of social exchange, whistleblowers do not expect rewards from the organization, but 
they report because they want to help the organization. Whistleblower expects that he 
can be free from retaliatory behavior. This is evident, if they are given by high 
protection, it will be more courageous to disclose the errors that exist in the 
organization. 
For hypothesis 3, the ANOVA model analysis results show the interaction 
between the supervisor’s support and protection toward the fraud disclosure decision, 
which indicates F (1.429) = 3.094, p <0.086. The interaction results show that the 
interaction of the supervisor’s support and protection is significant at α = 0.10. The 
results show that at a low support level, high protection will result in a high fraud 
disclosure decision (M = 6,250), than if protection is low (4.1667). Results moderately 
support H3. Figure 1 shows that in low support, high protection will result in a higher 
decision than low protection, while on high support also the same. This means 
protection will strengthen the whistleblower to uncover fraud if supervisors support is 
low. The higher the support of supervisors and the higher the protection will motivate 
employees to make fraud disclosure. It can be concluded that protection is a variable 
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that moderates the influence of supervisor’s support to the decision of fraud 
disclosure. 
Table 2 
Results of ANOVA test  
Dependent Variable:   WhistleBlow   
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 137,417
a 3 45,806 17,008 ,000 
Intercept 1704,083 1 1704,083 632,740 ,000 
Support 27,000 1 27,000 10,025 ,003 
Protection 102,083 1 102,083 37,904 ,000 
Support * Protection 8,333 1 8,333 3,094 ,086 
Support * Protection * 
Job 
 
Error 
145,849 
 
 
               118,500 
3 
 
 
40 
20,836 
 
 
2,693 
7,572 ,000 
Total 1960,000 48    
Corrected Total 255,917 47    
a. R Squared = ,537 (Adjusted R Squared = ,505) 
Picture 1.   
Interaction Result between Supervisor’s Support and Protection 
 
To test hypothesis 4, is there any difference between the types of job that are 
auditor and non-auditor in whistleblowing decision because support of supervisors and 
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protection, the analysis used is ANOVA three-way interaction. Results of interaction 
testing of supervisor’s support, protection, and type of work are significant at p-value 
< 0,000. Figures 2 and 3 show a comparison of the decisions on conditions of the 
supervisor’s support of low and high support. Auditors will be higher in 
whistleblowing decisions when there is a high supervisor’s support and high 
protection (M = 8,800) than non-auditor (M = 8.42). However, the test results show 
that non-auditors disclose higher fraud disclosures when supervisor’s support is low, 
but high protection (M = 7.00) than auditors (M = 5.50). This expands Seifert's (2010) 
research on the interaction of interactional justice and distributive justice variables for 
the internal position of auditors or management accounting. Internal auditors will 
result in high internal whistleblowing if interactional justice and distributive justice 
are high. For management accountants, distributive justice does not affect 
whistleblowing decisions, when interactional justice is high. As a prosocial behavior, 
this study shows that high support results in high decisions, when given high 
protection, not because of the rewards. In Seifert (2010) research in high or low 
distributive justice conditions, non-auditors result in higher disclosure decisions than 
auditors when interactional justice is low. The study explains that under the conditions 
of superior support, non-auditors will result in higher whistleblowing decisions, due to 
high protection (M = 7.00) than auditors (M = 5.50), thus supporting hypothesis 4. 
 
 
 
5. 
Picture 2   
Interaction Result Between Protection and 
Type Job at Low Supervisor’s Support 
 
Picture 3 
Interaction Result Between Protection and 
Type Job at High Supervisor’s Support 
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Conclusion, Limitations, and Implications 
The study aims to explain the organizational factors that influence disclosure of 
fraud in local government organizations. This research is significant because this 
research explains the disclosure as prosocial behavior. As a prosocial behavior, 
whistleblowers make no effort to get any reward, as they reveal frauds that occur in 
local governmental organizations, but because of the reciprocal factors between 
employees and organizations, including supervisors. Employees will dare to decide to 
report any fraud when they feel supported by their supervisors. This research extends 
the findings of previous studies which suggest that a supervisor’s support influences 
disclosure decisions (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) and explains 
interactional justice (Seifert, 2010). 
The results of this research also explain the importance of protection for 
whistleblowers. The results showed that high protection is still required by the 
whistleblower to avoid the threat of retaliation. With an assumption that the disclosure 
of fraud is based on the theory of social exchange, then whistleblowers have 
demonstrated organizational citizenship behavior by protecting the organization from 
behaviors that undermine the organization and degrade people's confidence in the 
organization. As the organization rewards the whistleblowers, they must be protected 
from any threats and intimidation, including threats from supervisors. The results 
show that although supervisor’s support is low, if protection is high, then the 
possibility of a whistleblower will reveal high the fraud is high. This research results 
in opposite results from previous studies of the weakness of the anti-retaliation model 
(Moberly, 2006). This study states that protection against whistleblower remains 
essential, so protection is expected following established rules and implemented in 
actual practice. This is a form of response from the organization by following up on 
fraud disclosure reports and providing protection against whistleblowers. The results 
of the organizational responses in the previous period will be used as factors that 
encourage to uncover fraud in the next period (Taylor and Curtis, 2009). 
The results state that under a high supervisor’s support and high protection, 
auditors make a higher disclosure decision than non-auditors. However, when support 
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level is low, high protection leads non-auditors to make disclosure decisions higher 
than auditors. This is because of the high supervisor’s support, then the existing 
employees in the organization have a higher responsibility because of social 
exchanges with supervisors. Also, based on the theory of social reactance, non-auditor 
employees who may previously know or participate in making errors, then they will be 
more courageous to disclose the fraud that is in the organization because they feel 
responsible for correcting errors that exist in the organization. 
This study has a contribution which explains that organizational factors can 
encourage the disclosure of the fraud. In previous research, many studies have 
described the effects of individual factors, such as gender, ethical orientation, moral 
intensity, locus of control, experience and profession which affect the disclosure of 
fraud (Bhal & Daachick, 2011; Chiu, 2003; Curtis & Taylor, 2009; Miceli et al., 
2012). If within the organization there are individuals who have characteristics as 
mentioned in the previous research, then the organization can encourage the individual 
in disclosing the fraud. Based on the theory of social exchange, this study provides 
evidence that a supervisor’s support and protection can encourage disclosure 
decisions. Also, in the organization, there are also people who want to be free and 
maintain their professionalism. This is indicated by them who are doing an opposite 
reaction when they are pressured to cheat.  
This research has several weaknesses that may affect the research results. This is 
due to the determinant of disclosure of fraud as a complex and interrelated process 
between one variable with other variables. Firstly, contextual factors that may also 
affect disclosure decisions have not been considered, such as organizational climate. 
Second, in whistleblowing decisions, there are two possible different things: the 
intention to reveal and the actual disclosure made by whistleblowers. This research 
does not distinguish between the two. Thirdly, in the non-auditor category in this 
study, it is not explained by the position of participants in the organization. However, 
because the participants are students with an accounting education background, it is 
assumed that they understand the financial statements that exist in the organization. 
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This research provides implications that the practice in policy design and 
disclosure procedures require high protection on the whistleblowers. The protection 
provided is not only limited to regulations but also implemented in practice. While the 
suggestions for further research are: First, research can include the moderate variable 
that is culture or organizational climate. Secondly, further research may furtherly 
examine the reporting parties who may participate in organizational fraud (justice 
collaborator), so with this position, there is any chance that they will report the fraud. 
Thirdly, in this research, the disclosure of fraud is more internal, the next study can 
consider reporting to an external party. 
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